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ABSTRACT
We distilled research findings on sources of unreliable
testimony from children into four principles that capture how the
field of forensic developmental psychology conceptualizes this topic.
The studies selected to illustrate these principles address three
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major questions: (a) how do young children perform in eyewitness
studies, (b) why are some children less accurate than others, and
(c) what phenomena generate unreliable testimony? Throughout
our research, our focus is on factors other than lying that produce
inaccurate or seemingly inconsistent autobiographical reports.
Collectively, this research has shown that (a) children’s
eyewitness accuracy is highly dependent on context, (b)
neurological immaturity makes children vulnerable to errors under
some circumstances, and (c) some children are more swayed by
external influences than others. Finally, the diversity of factors
that can influence the reliability of children’s testimony dictates
that (d) analyzing children’s testimony as if they were adults (i.e.,
with adult abilities, sensibilities, and motivations) will lead to
frequent misunderstandings. It takes considerable knowledge of
development—including
information
about
developmental
psycholinguistics, memory development, and the gradual
emergence of cognitive control—to work with child witnesses and to
analyze cases as there are many sources of unreliable testimony.
I.

SOURCES OF UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY FROM CHILDREN

Interest in the reliability of children’s testimony increased
during the 1980s and early 1990s, when exposés of high-profile
day care abuse cases chronicled allegations that were unlikely
and, sometimes, clearly impossible.1 Two opinions developed
among professionals: that something must have happened in
these cases and that allegations could arise in the absence of
abuse. To explore these possibilities, researchers reproduced
various case features in field and laboratory settings and observed
what happened.2 Collectively, they studied how numerous factors
1. See Douglas Linder, The McMartin Preschool Abuse Trial: A
TRIALS
(2003),
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty
Commentary,
FAMOUS
/projects/ftrials/mcmartin/mcmartinaccount.html; see also Nadja Schreiber et
al., Suggestive Interviewing in the McMartin Preschool and Kelly Michaels
Daycare Abuse Cases: A Case Study, 1 SOC. INFLUENCE 16, 19 (2006)
(analyzing interviews from the two cases).
2. See generally Maggie Bruck & Laura Melnyk, Individual Differences
in Children’s Suggestibility: A Review and Synthesis, 18 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 947 (2004); Debra Ann Poole, Sonja P. Brubacher & Jason J.
Dickinson, Children as Witnesses, in APA HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC
PSYCHOLOGY (Brian L. Cutler & Patricia A. Zapf eds., 2d ed. forthcoming);
Gabrielle Principe et al., Children as Witnesses, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
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influence children’s event reports, including the information
encountered in daily life, the characteristics of target events and
the interviews that follow, and the individual differences that lead
to strikingly diverse testimonies even among children of the same
age. 3
Today, the biggest impediment to understanding children’s
testimony is a widespread tendency to reduce the complex findings
from these studies into absolutes. For example, the belief that
“children do not lie about sexual abuse” 4 exists alongside the idea
that eyewitness research “created a backlash that called into
question the general reliability of all child testimony,” 5 and
conference attendees frequently refer to two “sides” or “camps”
regarding children’s testimonial abilities. This either-or way of
thinking is confusing to eyewitness researchers, partly because
most investigators are uninterested in lying (they study other
mechanisms underlying false reports), but also because children’s
behavior is too variable to be accurately captured by such firm
resolutions. 6
Our goal is to provide a more productive starting point for
case analyses and policy efforts by distilling research findings on
sources of unreliable testimony into four principles that capture
how the field of forensic developmental psychology conceptualizes
this topic. 7 The studies we selected to illustrate these principles
APPLIED MEMORY (D.S. Lindsay & T. Perfect eds., forthcoming Dec. 2013)
[hereinafter Principe et al., 2013].
3. See, e.g., Bruck & Melnyk, supra note 2, at 986–87; Poole, Brubacher
& Dickinson, supra note 2; Principe et al. 2013 supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Do Children Lie Abuse Sexual Abuse?, RAPE AND ABUSE
CRISIS CENTER (July 2012), https://www.raccfm.com/iles/do%20children%20
lie%20about%20sexual%20abuse.pdf; Child Sexual Abuse, AM. HUMANE
ASS’N, http://www.americanhumane.org/children/stop-child-abuse/fact-sheets/
child-sexual-abuse.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013).
5. Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who Allege Sexual
Abuse: Why Stereotypes Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child Testimony, 16
WIDENER L. REV. 239, 242 (2010).
6. Livia L. Gilstrap, Kristina Fritz, Amanda Torres & Annika Melinder,
Child Witnesses: Common Ground and Controversies in the Scientific
Community, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 59, 79 (2005).
7. See Maggie Bruck & Debra A. Poole, Introduction to the Special Issue
on Forensic Developmental Psychology, 22 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 331, 331
(2002) (introducing the term forensic developmental psychology to capture
the growing body of developmental studies that are grounded in basic
research yet designed to investigate psychological processes that have legal
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address three major questions: (a) how do young children perform
in eyewitness studies, (b) why are some children less accurate
than others, and (c) what phenomena generate unreliable
testimony? Throughout, our focus is on factors other than lying
that
produce
inaccurate
or
seemingly
inconsistent
autobiographical reports.
II. PATTERNS OF PERFORMANCE IN CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY

Results from three studies illustrate the tremendous
variability that is typical of children’s eyewitness performance
across different situations. 8 In the first, research assistants,
called “Mr. Science,” led three- to eight-year-olds through a set of
fun science demonstrations, their parents later read them a book
that described some things that had happened in the laboratory
along with some fictitious events, 9 and interviewers asked the
children to describe the Mr. Science experience before delivering
yes-no questions about the experienced and fictitious events
(including questions about whether Mr. Science had put
something yucky in their mouths or had pushed their tummies).10
Table 1 reports the percentage of questions about touching that
elicited false reports from children who had not been touched by
Mr. Science and had not heard anything about touching from the
book (left column). 11 Notice that these children rarely said “yes”
to yes-no questions about nonexperienced touching, which mirrors
the low error rates obtained when interviewers ask about
implications).
8. Debra Ann Poole & D. Stephen Lindsay, Children’s Eyewitness
Reports after Exposure to Misinformation from Parents, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 27, 49 (2001) [hereinafter Poole & Lindsay 2001];
Gabrielle F. Principe et al., Children’s Natural Conversations Following
Exposure to a Rumor: Linkages to Later False Reports, 113 J. OF
EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 383, 395 (2012) [hereinafter Principe et al.
2012]; Debra Ann Poole et al., Deficient Cognitive Control Fuels Children’s
Exuberant False Allegations, 118 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 101,108
(2014) [hereinafter Poole et al. 2014].
9. Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 29. There were actually two
demonstrations sets and numerous forms of the book so that each science
demonstration appeared in each condition across children (experienced,
experienced and mentioned in the book, only suggested by the book, or not
experienced and not suggested). Id. at 30.
10. Id. at 30.
11. Id. at 36.
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nonexperienced touching to the genitals and anus after pediatric
examinations. 12
Table 1
Percentage of Yes-No Questions About Non Experienced
Touching That Elicited False “Yes” Responses in Poole &
Lindsay (2001, Session 2)
Condition
Story parents read did not
Ages (years)
describe touching
3
0%
4
16%
5
0%
6
0%
7
0%
8
0%

Story parents read
described touching
37%
42%
38%
33%
33%
36%

But we cannot form an accurate picture of children’s
testimony from this data alone. The right column of Table 1
reports how children performed when their stories had mentioned
nonexperienced touching: now they falsely reported touching
roughly a third of the time, and many went on to provide
narrative accounts of these events.13 Interestingly, some of the
older children who made false reports actually knew they had not
been touched but failed to clarify this when answering yes-no
questions (even though the interviewer had instructed them to
talk only about things that really happened). 14 Together with
results from other studies, we know that it takes special questions
to clarify the source of information when children parrot
comments they heard before an interview. 15 Confusing something
that was only mentioned by an adult with something that actually
12. See, e.g., Margaret S. Steward & David S. Steward, Interviewing
Young Children about Body Touching and Handling, 61 MONOGRAPHS OF THE
SOC’Y FOR RES. IN CHILD DEV. 1, 105 (1996).
13. Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 38.
14. Id. at 44.
15. Id. at 46. See also Principe et al. 2012, supra note 8, at 399; Debra
Ann Poole & D. Stephen Lindsay, Reducing Child Witnesses’ False Reports of
Misinformation from Parents, 81 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 117, 135–
36 (2002) [hereinafter Poole & Lindsay 2002].
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happened is a type of “source-monitoring” error, and young
children are especially prone to these errors. 16 Because source
monitoring is also deficient in some adults with injuries to the
frontal lobe of the brain, cognitive psychologists believe that
neurological immaturity contributes to the fact that young
children are often more influenced by misinformation compared to
older children and adults. 17
A second study illustrates that the detrimental effect of
misinformation replicates across different procedures.18 Gabrielle
Principe and her research team arranged for children (ages three
to six years old) to watch a magic show that was carried out by an
assistant called Magic Mumfry. 19 At the end of the show, Mumfry
tried, unsuccessfully, to pull a rabbit out of a hat and apologized
for the failed trick.20 Children in an Overheard condition then
heard two adults conversing about a loose rabbit in the school
(which was the target rumor), whereas children in the Classmate
condition only mingled afterward with these children (while
digital recorders documented their conversations). 21 Finally,
children in the Control condition did not hear the rumor or
interact with children who had.22 All children were interviewed
one week and four weeks after the magic show (with instructions
to tell interviewers “only about things that you remember
happening to you—things that you really did or remember seeing
with your own eyes.”) 23
Table 2 reports findings from the four-week delay for five- and
six-year-olds.24 As in other studies, few children in the Control
group, who had not been exposed to the rumor, reported the
falsehood, and false reports that did occur were in response to
16. KIM P. ROBERTS & MARK BLADES, CHILDREN’S SOURCE MONITORING
321 (2000). Source monitoring refers to the ability to make decisions about
where knowledge or a specific memory originated. See Marcia K. Johnson et
al., Source Monitoring, 114 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 3, 3 (1993).
17. Daniel L. Schacter et al., True and False Memories in Children and
Adults: A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L.
411, 421 (1995).
18. See Principe et al. 2012, supra note 8, at 399.
19. Id. at 386.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 389.
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specific questions about the rumor.25 The picture was quite
different, though, for children who had overheard the rumor or
had interacted with informed peers: nearly all of these children
reported the rumor, some volunteered elaborate narratives about
the fictitious event (e.g., “He bit my foot and I went ‘Ouch, you
stop that now, bunny,’ and he bit my foot. He bit my finger too. I
tried to feed him halfway, and he bit.”), and a substantial
percentage of the children’s narratives could be traced directly to
conversations among peers. 26 Replicating results from the Mr.
Science paradigm, fewer children reported actually seeing the
activity when interviewers asked about the source of their
knowledge, but still many did (10% in the Overheard condition
and 35% in the Classmate condition). 27 Other studies using the
rumor paradigm have confirmed that false information embedded
in natural conversations with peers has a particularly detrimental
influence on eyewitness accuracy. 28 This is summarized in Table
2 below.

25. Id. Because other studies also found low error rates during openended interviewing (e.g., “Tell me what happened.”), many authors have
concluded that the information obtained from these prompts is largely
accurate. However, most studies that are the basis for this conclusion did not
expose children to misinformation before interviews. Though not found with
Principe et al.’s (2012) procedures, it is common for misinformation presented
before interviews to infiltrate children’s freely-recalled narratives, leading
Ceci and his colleagues to include faith in the accuracy of these narratives as
one of several myths about children’s eyewitness testimony. Stephen J. Ceci
et al., Unwarranted Assumptions about Children’s Testimonial Accuracy, 3
ANN. REV. OF CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 311, 318 (2007).
26. Principe et al. 2012, supra note 8, at 390, 393.
27. Id. at 390.
28. Gabrielle F. Principe & Erica Schindewolf, Natural Conversations as
a Source of False Memories in Children: Implications for the Testimony of
Young Witnesses, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 205, 214 (2012).
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Table 2
Percentage of 5- and 6-Year-Olds Who Reported a False Rumor 4
Weeks After the Event in Principe et al. (2012)
Interview Phase (question type)
Condition
Open-ended
Specific
Total
Overheard
71%
24%
95%
Classmate
95%
5%
100%
Control
0%
11%
11%
Note. Interviewers asked specific questions only to children who
did not discuss the target rumor during open-ended questioning.
Following publication of early misinformation studies, many
professionals concluded that children accurately recall personal
experiences, but can be misled by strong misinformation
procedures. 29 A related claim was that most cases did not involve
misinformation as it has been delivered in these sorts of studies,
so suggestibility researchers have exaggerated the risks of errors
in actual cases.30 Setting aside the issue of how often cases
include suggestive influences, these conclusions are misleading for
two reasons: many misinformation procedures are far from strong
and, in fact, it does not take any explicit misinformation at all to
elicit false reports from some children. 31
To illustrate how a specific collection of factors can influence
testimony, meet a boy we will call Mikey, who, at almost six years
old, visited Mr. Science to participate in a paradigm called Germ
Detective! 32 Before some hands-on activities about germs (the
target event), assistants created an atmosphere of concern about
touching by telling Mikey that there was a new germ rule: Mr.
Science was no longer allowed to touch children’s skin because the
research team did not want to spread the germs that cause colds
and flu.33 During the subsequent activities, Mr. Science “forgot”
29. Kathleen Coulborn Faller, False Accusations of Child Maltreatment:
A Contested Issue, 29 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1327, 1328 (2005).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 30 (using misleading
information about touching which was only several seconds of narrative).
32. Jason J. Dickinson & Debra A. Poole, Mr. Science—Germ Detective!:
A Novel Paradigm for Manipulating Disclosure Histories for Research on
Children’s Eyewitness Testimony, Presented at the Annual Meeting of the
APLS Conference (Mar. 14, 2012).
33. See id.
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the germ rule two times. Mikey returned for an interview the
following week, and later we invited him back for another
session 34 to learn more about why he was prone to errors in the
face of a technique that sometimes produces thoughtless
responding.35
During Mikey’s session, a researcher pointed to places on a
human body diagram to determine Mikey’s names for certain body
parts (“What’s this?”).36 The researcher then asked if Mr. Science
had touched him in any of the places on the diagram when he
played Germ Detective!, marked the spot Mikey pointed to, and
said, “Did Mr. Science touch you somewhere else?” until Mikey
replied “no.” 37 With this procedure, Mikey falsely accused Mr.
Science of twenty-nine distinct touches before the interviewer
terminated questioning.38 He then accused the researcher of ten
touches when she asked if she had touched him, and he added
three more false reports when she asked about touching to specific
parts on the diagram. 39 As in other studies, the children who
made false reports often described realistic context when asked to
explain what happened. 40 For example, one child told the
researcher that she “touched me here so you could feel me am I
burning up or not.” 41 Of course, the researcher had just met
Mikey, after which they walked into a room and sat on opposite
sides of the table. 42 Mikey was one of the “exuberant false
reporters” in this study—children who made more than three false
accusations of touching against Mr. Science.43 These children
ranged in age from four to seven years old, with the majority being
five years or older.44
34. Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8, at 103.
35. Debra Ann Poole & Maggie Bruck, Divining testimony? The Impact
of Interviewing Props on Children’s Reports of Touching, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL
REV. 165, 174 (2012); Debra Ann Poole & Jason J. Dickinson, Evidence
Supporting Restrictions on Uses of Body Diagrams in Forensic Interviews, 35
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 659, 660 (2011).
36. Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8, at 103.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44. Id.

POOLEFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/2/2014 5:49 PM

SOURCES OF UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY

391

The studies reviewed thus far illustrate the wide range of
performance that is typical of eyewitness studies, from largely
accurate (when children have not been exposed to misleading
information or an atmosphere of concern about touching) to highly
inaccurate. Furthermore, results cannot be captured by a simple
conclusion that only the youngest children are suggestible. While
it is true that false “yes” responses among children who were not
exposed to misinformation were limited to younger children in the
first study, this was not the case when children were exposed to
misinformation: now older children reported nearly as many false
reports as the younger children did (until the interviewer
delivered instructions asking them to distinguish between
experienced and suggested events, in which case the older
children were more, though not completely, accurate). 45 It is also
possible to construct situations in which younger children report
more accurately than older children (which psychologists call
reverse age trends or developmental reversals). 46 This tends to
happen when older children have knowledge about certain types of
events that conflicts with what happened or that leads them to
think about related information (whereas younger children do not
have such knowledge) so that highly associated but
nonexperienced details infiltrate older children’s reports. These
findings bring us to the first principle of children’s testimony:
Principle #1. Eyewitness errors result from the
architecture of children’s brains interacting with specific
contexts and tasks. Young children are often less reliable
witnesses than older children and adults, but age trends
are flat or even reversed in some circumstances.
Child witness experts always think in terms of Brain +
Context. On the Brain side, we have children’s ages and
information about abilities and conditions associated with
performance during memory interviews. On the Context side, we
have evidence of adult influence, the types of questions
interviewers ask, and other environmental factors that influence
accuracy. Cases with no evidence of adult influence are analyzed
45. Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 36.
46. C.J. Brainerd & V.F. Reyna, Reliability of Children’s Testimony in
The Era of Developmental Reversals, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL REV., 224, 237
(2012).
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differently than cases with significant adult influence or cases
with investigative techniques that are incompatible with
children’s brains.

III. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN CHILDREN’S EYEWITNESS
PERFORMANCE

Although all children in the Classmate condition in Table 2
came to report an event that never happened, it is more typical for
some children to cave to suggestive influences while others do not.
What are the characteristics of inaccurate children?
To investigate this question, we gave a battery of
developmental tasks to Mikey and some other children who had
participated in the Germ Detective! paradigm. 47
Highly
inaccurate children were different from accurate children in the
following ways.
 Inaccurate children were very hands-on: they continued to
reach out and use objects even after they had just repeated a “no
touching” rule delivered by the interviewer. (We used instructions
from Bresnard 48 but substituted child-appropriate objects).
Unlike more accurate children, these children could not use a rule
to guide their behavior even for short periods of time. 49
 Inaccurate children found it hard to inhibit a prepotent
response: they performed poorly when asked to tap once when the
researcher tapped twice but twice when the researcher tapped
once.50 Yet, on an alternate response conflict task in which
working memory demands were lessened because the stimuli
(pictures) remained in view, 51 accurate and inaccurate children
47. Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8, at 101.
48. See generally J. Bresnard, P. Allain, G. Aubin, V. Chauviré, F.
Etcharry-Bouyx & D. Le Gall, A Contribution to the Study of Environmental
Dependency Phenomena: The Social Hypothesis, 49 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 3279–
3294 (2011); Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8, at 104.
49. Poole et al. et al 2014, supra note 8, at 105–07.
50. See generally Adele Diamond & Colleen Taylor, Development of an
Aspect of Executive Control: Development of the Abilities to Remember What I
Said and to “Do As I Say, Not as I Do,” 29 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY
315 (1996).
51. See generally Cherie L. Gerstadt, Yoon Joo Hong & Adele Diamond,
The Relationship Between Cognition and Action: Performance of Children 3
1/2–7 Years Old on a Stroop-Like Day-Night Test, 53 COGNITION 129 (1994).
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performed similarly.52
 Inaccurate children could not report what someone else
was thinking when that information differed from what they
knew. 53 For example, they watched assistants enact a story with
dolls in which a girl saw a ball go into a beach bag, after which her
playmate moved it to a box without her knowledge. 54 When the
doll returned and the assistant asked “Where will she look?”,
many of the children who were inaccurate about the Germ
Detective! event said, “The box” (i.e., where they knew it was).55
These results demonstrate that children like Mikey have
difficulty using thoughts to guide their behavior. 56 Broadly
speaking, they do poorly on tests of executive function/cognitive
control, which are the “processes associated with the control of
thought and action.” 57 During development, cognitive control
improves as individual brain regions mature and become
organized into increasingly specialized circuits. 58 Children who
have good cognitive control can attend to information in the
environment that is relevant to the current situation and filter out
what is not, attend to memories that are related to the topic of
conversation and filter out memories from other experiences
(reality filtering), store information in working memory and work
with it (such as the questions interviewers ask), maintain
contextual
information
that
distinguishes
relevant
thoughts/actions from irrelevant thoughts/actions (task-set
52. See Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8, at 105.
53. See id. at 105–07.
54. See Alison Gopnik & Janet W. Astington, Children's Understanding
of Representational Change and its Relation to The Understanding of False
Belief and The Appearance-Reality Distinction, 59 CHILD DEV. 26, 27 (1988);
Heinz Wimmer & Josef Perner, Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation and
Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children's Understanding
of Deception, 13 COGNITION 103, 108 (1983).
55. See Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8, at 104.
56. See generally Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8.
57. Silvia A. Bunge & Eveline A. Crone, Neural correlates of the
development of cognitive control, in NEUROIMAGING IN DEVELOPMENTAL
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 22 (Judith M. Rumsey & Monique Ernst eds., 2009).
58. Beatriz Luna, Aarthi Padmanabhan & Kristen O’Hearn, What has
fMRI Told us About the Development of Cognitive Control through
Adolescence?, 72 BRAIN AND COGNITION 101, 112 (2010); Beatriz Luna & John
A. Sweeney, The Emergence of Collaborative Brain Function: fMRI Studies of
The Development of Response Inhibition, 1021 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF
SCI. 296, 300 (2004).
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representation), switch goals as tasks switch (task-switching; e.g.,
when the topic changes, shift to talk about that topic), and inhibit
inappropriate responses.59
Although all children struggle with these things some of the
time, a subset of children have more difficulty: compared to their
peers, these children have poor cognitive control. 60 In our study,
performance on three of the developmental tasks correctly
categorized 90% of the children as either exuberant false reporters
or typical children, and the common variance among tasks
predicted the number of false reports. 61 This leads to the next two
principles of children’s testimony:
Principle #2. The architecture of children’s brains is
different from the architecture of adults’ brains, and
these differences produce differences in executive
processing/cognitive control that can influence eyewitness
performance.
Principle #3. Even within a specific age, children vary
widely in the extent to which they stay on topic, keep
rules in mind, and gate out irrelevant thoughts and
actions. Although many children are reluctant to disclose
experienced touching, a subset of children readily disclose
nonexperienced touching. Understanding the dynamics
of the first situation does not help us understand the
dynamics of the second situation.
Maggie Bruck recently said that people “should be able to
keep two thoughts in mind at once.” 62 Keeping two thoughts in
mind means realizing that children can be very accurate and very
inaccurate, and you need to understand both sides of this issue to
analyze children’s testimony. But keeping two thoughts in mind
is more than just knowing that a specific child can be accurate in
59. Bunge & Crone, supra note 57.
60. See generally Inge-Marie Eigsti et al., Predicting Cognitive Control
From Preschool to Late Adolescence and Young Adulthood, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI.
478 (2006).
61. Poole et al. 2014, supra note 8.
62. Personal Communication with Maggie Bruck (Mar. 10, 2013). In The
Crack-Up, F. Scott Fitzgerald voiced the same sentiment when he said that
“the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in
the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.” F. Scott
Fitzgerald, The Crack-Up, ESQUIRE (1936).
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one situation and inaccurate in another: it also means recognizing
the important individual differences among children. Therefore,
there is variability in the architecture of the brains that come to
eyewitness tasks as well as variability in children’s contexts (their
experiences before and during eyewitness interviews).
The
numerous ways that children’s developmental levels and
experiences combine to produce unreliable testimony, which we
turn to next, provide the background for our last principle of
children’s testimony.
IV. MECHANISMS UNDERLYING UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY

In a study we described earlier, Mr. Science started each
session by setting a red tomato-shaped kitchen timer while
explaining that this was how much time they had to play.63
Remarkably, a dozen children later told interviewers about the
“potato,” including one child who said, “[t]here was a big clock like
a potato.” 64
Months after a short event, this 3.5-year-old
demonstrated impressive memory for the object even though it
was not big, it was not a clock, and it was not a potato. 65
The proliferation of potatoes has a simple explanation:
children acquire bilabial sounds (such as /m/ and /p/) sooner than
lingua-alveolar sounds (such as /t/) and avoid words they cannot
pronounce.66 This example illustrates that testimony—whether
from an adult or from a child—is rarely entirely accurate or
entirely inaccurate.67 Instead, numerous factors are associated
with the reliability of small details and the critical events
embedded in those details, including memory errors that plague
all humans and phenomena that are more common among young
witnesses and those with cognitive impairments.68
A. Linguistic Confusions
There is an ever-present threat of misunderstanding children
63. See Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 29.
64. See generally id.
65. See generally id.
66. See, e.g., PETER A. REICH, LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT 54–57 (1986);
Graham Williamson, Speech Sound Development Chart, SLT INFO (June 24,
2012), http://www.sltinfo.com/speech-sound-development-chart.html.
67. See generally Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8.
68. See generally Poole, Brubacher & Dickinson, supra note 2
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due to linguistic phenomena involving individual speech sounds,
words, sentences, and even rules that govern the social uses of
language. Errors can appear in case documentation and even
change children’s testimony (through a process we will describe
later in which children come to accept adults’ interpretations of
their testimony). 69
Disarticulations are errors in the production of speech sounds
that make it difficult to understand children. In an interviewer
training one of us attended, for example, an attendee heard a child
say “He put some paint on my arm” when, actually, the child had
said, “He put some ting on my arm” (i.e., “He put something on my
arm”), illustrating a common mistake in which children delete one
of two consonants that occur together (consonant cluster
reduction). 70 Children also substitute sounds, as a child in one of
our laboratories did when she repeatedly referred to being given
“dope.” The interviewer knew this child was likely referring to the
hand sanitizer used to clean children’s hands (referred to by many
of the children as “soap”), but in actual investigative interviews
pronunciation problems and mumbling can lead to serious errors
that send investigations off in wrong directions. For example, we
have heard interviewers ignore responses they could not
understand and continue to pursue faulty hypotheses even after
children had attempted to set conversations on track. 71 Younger
children are also more likely than older children to use ambiguous
words, which can lead to confusion about the identity of a suspect
or the number of suspects. 72 For example, Battin, Ceci, and Lust
showed younger (three to five years) and older (six to nine years)
children a short video of two men and two women who were
engaged in a task that ended in a misdeed by one of the women.73
In response to free recall prompts to describe what happened, the
majority of younger children used incorrect pronouns (e.g., “they”)
69. See discussion infra notes 140–45 and accompanying text.
70. What Kids Can Tell Us: A Critical Assessment of Interview
Strategies, Training Institute sponsored by Cornell University and The Just
“For Kids!” Foundation, Inc. (June 4–6, 1996).
71. For a discussion of common pronunciation problems, see ERIKA HOFF,
LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT (5th ed. forthcoming 2013).
72. David B. Battin et al., Do Children Really Mean What They Say? The
Forensic Implications of Preschoolers’ Linguistic Referencing, 33 J. APPLIED
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 167, 173 (2012).
73. Id. at 169.
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or ambiguous articles (e.g., “a . . . ” or “the . . . ”) to describe the
person who had performed the misdeed, whereas older children
were more likely to describe events clearly. 74 By the end of the
interview, older children were more likely than younger children
to have clarified ambiguous descriptions.75
It also takes time for children to learn the meaning of words
that seem simple to adults.76 For example, children may deny
having had clothes on if they were wearing a bathing suit (because
their definition of clothes does not include a bathing suit) or use
the word “yesterday” to mean some other time in the past. The
need to avoid late-acquired words is one of the biggest challenges
of interviewing young children, along with the need to word
questions in simple, direct ways that children understand.77
Children appreciate the need to take turns and cooperate in
conversations, but their desire to follow social conventions can
also mislead adults. One well-known tendency is their penchant
for answering questions even when they do not know the
answers.78 Another strategy they use to keep the conversational
ball rolling is illustrated by this example from Karen Saywitz:
Attorney: When you were at your grandma’s house with
your daddy, whose mamma is your grandma?
Jenny: Grandma Ann. (gives grandma’s name)
Attorney: Is she your daddy’s mamma?
Jenny: Huh? (doesn’t understand the question)
Attorney: Is she your daddy’s mamma? (leading question
requiring only a nod)

74.
75.
76.

Id. at 170.
Id. at 171.
ANNE GRAFFAM WALKER, HANDBOOK ON QUESTIONING CHILDREN: A
LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE 27–37, 39–44 (2d ed. 1999).
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., Amanda H. Waterman & Mark Blades, The Effect of Delay
and Individual Differences on Children’s Tendency to Guess, 49
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 215, 215–16 (2013).
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Jenny: Daddy’s mamma. (repeats the end of the sentence;
common response when communicating with children fails)
Attorney: Is grandma daddy’s mother? (requires only a nod
to force the adult to stop this line of questioning)
Jenny: She has a boyfriend, two boyfriends. (irrelevant
response) 79
Here, Jenny is confused about kinship terms but is adept at
turning conversation back to the attorney by repeating his last
words (i.e., “Daddy’s mamma” was not necessarily an answer) and,
finally, by bringing up information only loosely related to the
topic. 80 As Saywitz, Nathanson, and Snyder explained,
“[c]hildren’s apparent lack of credibility has as much to do with
the competence of adults to relate to and communicate with
children as it does with children’s abilities to remember and relate
their experiences accurately.” 81
These are just a few of the numerous language phenomena
that cause confusions during investigations. Because language is
still developing throughout the elementary school years and well
into adolescence, psychologists recommend that professionals who
work with child witnesses follow a set of developmentallyappropriate guidelines for speaking and consider language issues
whenever children make remarks that seem inconsistent or
thoughtless.82
B. Memory Phenomena
Memory, which has been described as “open to editing
anytime it’s pulled up,” is an ever-shifting approximation of
reality that is prone to errors and inconsistencies. 83 In eyewitness
79. Karen J. Saywitz, The Credibility of Child Witnesses, FAM. ADVOC.,
Winter 1988, at 38, 38–39.
80. See id.
81. Karen J. Saywitz, Rebecca Nathanson & Lynn S. Snyder, Credibility
of Child Witnesses: The Role of Communicative Competence, 13 TOPICS IN
LANGUAGE DISORDERS 59, 59 (1993).
82. See DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS
OF CHILDREN: A GUIDE FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS 178–80 (1998); see also
WALKER, supra note 76, at 77–84.
83. Greg Miller, How Are Memories Retrieved?, 338 SCI. 30, 31 (2012).
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cases, the issue is whether these problems exceed what is typically
found when people report past events under similar conditions.
Decisions about whether testimonial content is typical of
narratives that describe experienced events are based on
extensive knowledge of how memory works and the nature of
children’s autobiographical reports, 84 including the following
phenomena. 85
Schema and script-based errors. Schema (our internal
representations of the world) and scripts (general representations
of how things usually happen) give meaning to our experiences
but can interfere with accurate recollection. In one study, for
instance, children watched a slide show about a visit to
McDonald’s that omitted some central and noncentral details of a
typical trip. 86 When interviewed about the show, they often
inserted the expected details into responses to specific questions,
and they did so more often for central details (e.g., paying for the
food) and after a longer delay. 87 In our studies, these errors have
shown up as a description of a laboratory room that actually
matched another room in the child’s life, reports that Mr. Science
demonstrated a well-known science activity (e.g., a volcano) that
was not part of the demonstration set, and erroneous claims that
he shook hands at the beginning of the session or patted the child
on the back. As memories fade, children increasingly fill in the
blanks with information from general knowledge about how things
usually are and how people usually act. 88
Detail errors. When researchers expose children to events
without tampering with their memories, and then interview them
84. See generally Carole Peterson, Children’s Long-Term Memory for
Autobiographical Events, 22 Developmental Rev. 370 (2002); Carole Peterson,
Children’s Memory Reports Over Time: Getting Both Better and Worse, 109 J.
of Experimental Child Psychol. 275 (2011); Carole Peterson, Children’s
Autobiographical Memories Across the Years: Forensic Implications of
Childhood Amnesia and Eyewitness Memory for Stressful Events, 32
Developmental Rev. 287 (2012).
85. See Poole, Brubacher & Dickinson, supra note 2.
86. Alicia Erskine, Roslyn Markham & Pauline Howie, Children’s ScriptBased Inferences: Implications for Eyewitness Testimony, 16 COGNITIVE DEV.
871, 876 (2001).
87. Id. at 882.
88. See Marina Myles-Worsley, Cindy C. Cromer & David H. Dodd,
Children’s Preschool Script Reconstruction: Reliance of General Knowledge as
Memory Fades, 22 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 22, 27–28 (1986).
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days or month later, only a small percentage of the information
reported in response to open-ended requests to tell what happened
are detail errors, such as misreporting the color of an item or the
order of several events. 89 Nonetheless, these types of errors do
occur as children’s minds automatically fill in memory gaps.90
Although a few detail errors should not cause adults to question
the gist of the story, numerous details that do not mesh with
reality (after considering the ways children describe things)
should be cause for concern.
Reminiscence. Children rarely report everything they know
about an event in a single long narrative; instead, they add new
information when asked additional questions or when interviewed
on another occasion. 91 Error rates for these new details, though
typically not as high as for early-reported information, range from
largely accurate to problematic. One year after an event, for
example, the information a group of six-year-olds repeated from
their earlier testimony was accurate 98% of the time, whereas new
information was accurate only 76% of the time. 92 Among children
interviewed with toy props, which can prompt discussion about
details that were not part of the target event, only 51% of the new
information was accurate. 93
Misattributions. All age groups are prone to memory
misattributions: we remember an event but place it in the wrong
time or location, have a sense of familiarity about a face at the
grocery story but falsely recall how we know the person, and
believe we have novel insights we actually read on the Internet In
The Seven Sins of Memory, Daniel Schacter described the “lethal
recipe for misattribution”: a strong sense of familiarity along with
an absence of memories for the details that define specific episodes
of our lives. 94
89. Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 32–33.
90. See Myles-Worsley, Cromer & Dodd, supra note 88.
91. David La Rooy, Carmit Katz, Lindsay C. Malloy & Michael E. Lamb,
Do We Need to Rethink Guidance on Repeated Interviews?, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 373, 386 (2010).
92. Karen Salmon & Margaret-Ellen Pipe, Props and Children’s Event
Reports: The Impact of a 1-Year Delay, 65 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL.
261, 281 (1997).
93. Id.
94. DANIEL L. SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY: HOW THE MIND
FORGETS AND REMEMBERS 97 (2001).
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Accurate memories for individual episodes rely on mental
processes that bind together the various features that define those
memories and, later, strategically access them. 95 Because these
processes are not fully developed during childhood, it is easy to
nudge some children into falsely saying they experienced certain
events by exposing them to general information about those
events.96 This can be accomplished by reading children stories
that describe fictitious events,97 arranging for them to overhear
adults or other children talking about the events,98 or asking
misleading questions that convey the desired information.99
Misinformation does not have to originate from an individual who
is motivated to propagate it, however. Giving interviewers false
ideas about the nature of the event is enough to increase errors
(by increasing their use of suggestive techniques), 100 and rumors
rapidly spread beyond the children who initially encountered
them. 101
Sometimes just asking children to provide information they do
not have can lead them to confuse what really happened with selfgenerated information. This can occur when well-meaning
interviewers encourage children to provide responses because they
believe that a lack of response signals reluctance rather than

95. Vinaya Raj & Martha Ann Bell, Cognitive Processes Supporting
Episodic Memory Formation in Childhood: The Role of Source Memory,
Binding, and Executive Functioning, 30 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 384, 385
(2010).
96. Id. at 397.
97. See Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 44; Poole & Lindsay
2002, supra note 15, at 129.
98. See Principe et al. 2012, supra note 8.
99. See, e.g., William S. Cassel, Claudia E. M. Roebers & David F.
Bjorklund, Developmental Patterns of Eyewitness Responses to Repeated and
Increasingly Suggestive Questions, 61 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 116,
130 (1996); Thomas Hünefeldt, Annalisa Lucidi, Augusta Furia & Clelia
Rossi-Arnaud, Age Differences in the Interrogative Suggestibility of Children’s
memory: Do Shift Scores Peak Around 5–6 Years of Age?, 45 PERSONALITY AND
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 521, 524–25 (2008).
100. See Gail S. Goodman, Anupama Sharma, Sherry F. Thomas & Mary
Golden Considine, Mother Knows Best: Effects of Relationship Status and
Interviewer Bias on Children’s Memory, 60 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL.
195, 225 (1995); Gabrielle F. Principe, Julio DiPuppo & Jessie Gammel,
Effects of Mothers’ Conversation Style and Receipt of Misinformation on
Children’s Event Reports, 28 COGNITIVE DEV. 260, 268–70 (2013).
101. Principe & Schindewolf, supra note 28, at 220.
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ignorance or forgetting. To investigate the consequences of this
interviewing behavior, researchers pressed a group of six- and
nine-year old children to provide information they did not know at
a first interview.102 Demonstrating that consistent testimony is
not always accurate, some of them repeated the inaccurate
information at a second interview, and this effect was more
pronounced for the older children.103
Similarly, more explicit instructions to visualize or imagine
events can etch erroneous information into memory, and this
process can occur in daily life, during therapy sessions, or through
inexpert interviewing. This technique was used in the McMartin
Preschool case, as illustrated by the following excerpt:
Interviewer: Can you remember the naked pictures?
Child: (Shakes head “no”)
Interviewer: Can’t remember that part?
Child: (Shakes head “no”)
Interviewer: Why don’t you think about that for a while,
okay? Your memory might come back to you. 104
Stephen Ceci and his colleagues mimicked this influence by
repeatedly asking children (three to six years of age) to “make a
picture . . . in your head” of true and false events they were told
their parents had reported.105 During the last session, a new
interviewer said that the other interviewer had made mistakes
and had “told many children that things happened to them that
never happened” before asking about the target events.106
Although the children were highly accurate when reporting true
102. Stacia Stolzenberg & Kathy Pezdek, Interviewing Child Witnesses:
The Effect of Forced Confabulation on Event Memory, 114 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CHILD PSYCHOL. 77, 80 (2013).
103. Id. at 85.
104. Schreiber et al., supra note 1, at 28.
105. Stephen J. Ceci, Elizabeth F. Loftus, Michelle D. Leichtman &
Maggie Bruck, The Possible Role of Source Misattributions in the Creation of
False Beliefs Among Preschoolers, 42 INT’L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNOSIS 304, 309 (1994).
106. Id. at 310.
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events, they acquiesced to more than a quarter of the fictitious
events in the first interview session and to more than 40% in the
last.107
Confabulation. Adults with certain types of brain damage
invent answers to questions and tell fantastic but false stories
about their lives.108
Because the information in these
confabulations is often based on fragments of true memories that
are pieced together and displaced in time and place, researchers
believe that damage to certain regions of the brain interferes with
the ability to suppress memories that become activated but are
not relevant to the current situation.109 The idea that a filter
usually blocks task-irrelevant memories from intruding into
conversations is consistent with the finding that confabulating
patients produce fewer memory errors when they divide their
attention between two tasks, presumably because the second task
reduces the cognitive resources that would otherwise engage
irrelevant memories.110
Neurological immaturity is likely responsible for the fact that
some young children also produce fantastic narratives during
interviews.111 During the years when potty talk is funny,112 this
behavior can appear as silly scatological talk or as bizarre stories
with other themes.113 In one of our laboratories, for example, a
boy described how an owl flew into the room, and knocked over a
machin that blew the boy into the wall. Adults who do not realize
that children are “mental surfing,” 114 may ask inappropriate
follow-up questions that children sometimes acquiesce to, starting
a process that expands and entrenches the story.
False recognition and acquiescence. People commit false
107. See id. at 315–17 (describing results of false reports under milder
instructions).
108. See Armin Schnider, Spontaneous Confabulation and the Adaptation
of Thought to Ongoing Reality, 44 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE, 662, 663
(2003).
109. See id. at 667–68 (describing reality monitoring).
110. Elisa Ciaramelli et al., Divided attention during retrieval suppresses
false recognition in confabulation, 45 CORTEX, 141, 141 (2009).
111. See Schacter et al., supra note 17.
112. LOUIS B. AMES & FRANCES L. ILG, YOUR SIX YEAR OLD: LOVING AND
DEFIANT 71–72 (1979).
113. See generally STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE
COURTROOM: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY (1995).
114. We picked up this wonderful descriptor from Stephen Ceci.
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recognitions when they believe that novel stimuli were previously
encountered. Confabulating adults have higher rates of false
recognition, and both errors involve misattributing events to
previous experience, but false recognition and confabulation are
different phenomena because these types of errors do not always
occur together.115 In eyewitness tasks, inaccurately saying “yes”
to a specific question (e.g., “Did he touch you?) is typically called a
false recognition even though these responses can be memory
based (when some aspect of the stimulus triggers an unrelated
memory) or the product of acquiescence (i.e., going along with the
interviewer without a belief that the event actually occurred). 116
Compared to adults, children are not universally more likely
to falsely say “yes,” but there are circumstances that elevate error
rates. 117 Line-up tasks are especially problematic, and even
teenagers frequently select photos from target-absent lineups. In a
meta-analysis comparing adult and adolescent performance,
adults selected a photo only about a quarter of the time when the
perpetrator was not present, whereas children who were twelve
and thirteen years of age did so over half of the time. 118
C. Deficient Cognitive Control
Because the brain circuitry underlying cognitive control is
incomplete during childhood, young children often drift off topic
during conversations and respond thoughtlessly due to
deficiencies that persist into later ages among individuals with
cognitive impairments.119
Drifting off topic. Young children have difficulty acting on
rules and task sets, so they often share information that is
unrelated to the topic of conversation. 120 Consider a study
115. See generally Ciaramelli, supra note 110.
116. See Henry Otgaar et al., The Origin of Children's Implanted False
Memories: Memory Traces or Compliance? 139 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA, 397, 397
(2012) (discussing of the role of memory vs. compliance in suggestibility).
117. See generally Schacter et al., supra note 17, at 411.
118. Joanna D. Pozzulo & R.C.L. Lindsay, Identification Accuracy of
Children Versus Adults: A Meta-Analysis, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 549, 557
(1998).
119. See, e.g., Denise Valenti-Hein, Use of Visual Tools to Report Sexual
Abuse for Adults with Mental Retardation, 40 MENTAL RETARDATION 297, 301
(2002).
120. Poole & Lindsay 2001, supra note 8, at 27.

POOLEFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/2/2014 5:49 PM

SOURCES OF UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY

405

described earlier in which interviewers elicited free narrative
accounts of visits to Mr. Science by first asking children to tell
everything that happened and then following with three
additional prompts that mentioned the science room. 121 For the
fifth prompt, interviewers simply asked if there was something
the children had not told that they could tell now. 122 Despite the
fact that interviewers and children had been talking only about
the Mr. Science experience, many children did not assume that
the final prompt referred to that topic, as in these examples:
four-year-old girl: Ghost, pumpkins, and a spider. Didn’t
crawl on me. . .watch, that’s when you drop drop and roll.
(Child moved to the floor and did a fire protection
demonstration.) 123
eight-year-old male: We have two dogs and two cats in
our family. We used to have a fish, but it died. 124
Notice that the first child did not make it clear she was
talking about something other than the topic of conversation. In
investigations, this behavior can lead interviewers to link new
people and actions to their beliefs about target events, with
subsequent questioning causing children to gradually weave this
new information into their reports.
Reacting inappropriately to immediate stimuli. Partly
due to working memory limitations, cognitively immature children
tend to respond to the pull of external stimuli more than other
children do.125 Behaviors such as off-topic exploring of anatomical
dolls, repeatedly and inaccurately pointing to body diagrams, and
answering “yes” or “no” without thought are examples of how
children sometimes respond inappropriately to what is in front of
them or what is said. Among a subset of children, behaviors
associated with greater dependence on environmental stimuli

121. See id. at 29–31.
122. Id. at 30.
123. See id. at 32.
124. See id. at 46.
125. See generally Joseph S. Raiker et al., Objectively-Measured
Impulsivity and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD): Testing
Competing Predictions from the Working Memory and Behavioral Inhibition
Models of ADHD, 40 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL., 699, 699 (2012).
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persist longer in development than is typical.126
D. Contributing Factors and the Subsequent Cascade
Eyewitness researchers are interested in how a confluence of
factors, each of which may not be strongly associated with false
reports in isolation, can create a snowball of erroneous
information that grows larger and larger as it races down the
investigative hill. For instance, a mother may become concerned
about abuse after a child makes an ambiguous comment. Wanting
to get to the bottom of the matter, she then creates an atmosphere
of concern by repeated questioning, sometimes distorting what the
child said and resorting to leading questions. Most typicallydeveloping older children would not create false memories of a
significant event that presumably just occurred, but even older
children and adults are vulnerable in the face of suggestions about
long-ago events. 127 Because the emergence of credible false
reports is often a process, experts who create case time-lines
(summaries of all people, events, and allegations over time) look
for evidence of the following contributing factors. 128
Honest misunderstandings. Many abuse investigations
are triggered by suspicions of abuse rather than children’s reports,
and children’s behavior provides numerous reasons why adults
might develop unwarranted suspicions. 129 For example, a lack of
vocabulary and knowledge leads them to report events in
misleading ways (e.g., saying “Aiden saw his mom and dad have
sex” when the pair was merely kissing), and their drawings often
contain innocent yet phallic-looking shapes.
A situation in one of our laboratories illustrates this process.
An upset mother called the scheduling manager after her child
126. See, e.g., Megan F. Nicpon, et al., Utilization Behavior in Boys with
ADHD: A Test of Barkley’s Theory, 26 DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY
735, 747 (2004).
127. See, e.g., Henry Otgaar et al., Abducted by a UFO: Prevalence
Information Affects Young Children's False Memories for an Implausible
Event, 23 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115, 115 (2009) (describing a study
that elicited reports of alien abduction from 11- and 12-year-olds).
128. See generally MARGARET-ELLEN PIPE ET AL., CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE:
DISCLOSURE, DELAY, AND DENIAL 77 (2007).
129. See generally STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE
COURTROOM: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY (1995).
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told her we had played “dirty doctor games.” She had not
consented to such things, she explained, apparently not realizing
that this is how a child might explain our germ-related activities.
She arrived to watch the session recording with notes she had
made of the conversation and, after much laughter about what
had happened, gave permission for us to use this story in reports
of our findings. Investigators often clarify misunderstandings by
asking children to describe events more fully in their own words
(“from the very beginning to the end”) but, unfortunately, the
following influences can complicate efforts to discover the truth.
Negative stereotypes and an atmosphere of accusation.
Adults who believe that other individuals have certain
characteristics sometimes make repeated remarks that lead
children to falsely report behavior consistent with those
characteristics. The classic study on this process is the Sam Stone
study by Leichtman and Ceci. 130 For the target event, a stranger
called Sam Stone briefly visited day care centers, during which
Children assigned to the
nothing remarkable happened.131
stereotype condition were visited by a research assistant
beforehand who described Sam as a clumsy person. 132 After Sam’s
visit, children who had and had not been exposed to the negative
stereotype were interviewed four times, either neutrally or
suggestively, followed by a final neutral interview for all
children.133
Children who experienced neither the stereotype nor
suggestive interviews were highly accurate: on the fifth interview,
no child in this control group made a false allegation in response
to open-ended requests to describe what happened, 134 few falsely
acquiesced to more specific prompts about events that had not
occurred, 135 and the children who falsely acquiesced often
retracted false reports when challenged.136 Exposure to the
130. See Michelle D. Leichtman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Effects of
Stereotypes and Suggestions on Preschoolers’ Reports, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 568, 570–76 (1995).
131. Id. at 570.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 570–71.
134. Id. at 571.
135. Id. at 571, 578 (“I heard something about a book [a teddy bear]. Do
you know anything about that?”).
136. Id. (“You didn’t really see him do anything to the book [the teddy

POOLEFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/2014 5:49 PM

408 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:382
negative stereotype elevated the number of false reports in
response to specific prompts, and results were dramatically
different among children exposed to both forms of influence: 46%
of the three- and four-year-olds and 30% of the five- and six-yearolds spontaneously reported suggested misdeeds in their free
narrative accounts of the visit.137 Videotapes of the children
captured creative confabulation as they embellished the
suggestions to build a good story. 138 The Sam Stone study showed
that results from study designs that do not include an atmosphere
of concern or negative stereotypes cannot be generalized to cases
in which this is a prominent feature. 139
Interviewer modifications. Expectations about what
children will say and difficulties understanding them often lead
interviewers to repeat back statements that do not match the
original testimonies. For example, Kim Roberts and Michael Lamb
found 140 instances in which interviewers misinterpreted or
distorted children’s remarks in only sixty-eight sexual abuse
interviews.140 Many distortions involved actions and the identity
of people. 141 Most important, children corrected or disagreed with
these errors only one-third of the time. 142 When interviewers
were not corrected, they continued to refer to the erroneous
information for the rest of the interview. 143
Jennifer Hunt and Eugene Borgida reproduced this process in
the laboratory with interviewers who intentionally distorted five
answers.144 Their participants (three- to five-year-olds, nine- to
eleven-year-olds, and adults) disagreed only 27% of the time, with
younger children more often incorporating the distorted
information into answers to questions delivered later in the

bear], did you?”).
137. Id. at 572–73.
138. Id. at 573.
139. Id. at 576.
140. Kim P. Roberts & Michael E. Lamb, Children’s responses when
interviewers distort details during investigative interviews, 4 LEGAL & CRIM.
PSYCHOL. 23, 25, 27–30 (1999).
141. Id. at 28–30.
142. Id. at 29.
143. Id.
144. Jennifer S. Hunt & Eugene Borgida, Is That What I Said?:
Witnesses’ Responses to Interviewer Modifications, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 583,
586–90 (2001).
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interview. 145 Of course, this process can occur during informal
conversations before investigations as well as during investigative
interviews.
V. INTERIM SUMMARY

Research has shown that children’s eyewitness accuracy is
highly dependent on context, that neurological immaturity makes
children vulnerable to certain errors, and that some children are
more affected by external influences than others due to individual
differences. The long list of factors that can influence the
reliability of children’s testimony brings us to the final principle:
Principle #4. Analyzing children’s testimony as if they
were adults, with adult abilities, sensibilities, and
motivations, leads to frequent misunderstandings. It
takes
considerable
knowledge
of
development
(developmental psycholinguistics, memory development,
cognitive control, etc.) to work with child witnesses and to
analyze cases because there are many sources of
unreliable testimony.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In medicine, law, and child protection, the knowledge
domains that support decision-making are “ill-structured” in the
sense that “individual cases of knowledge application are typically
multidimensional and there is considerable variability in the
structure and content across cases of the same nominal type.”146
A pervasive problem in such fields is the reductive bias, which is a
“tendency for people to treat and interpret complex circumstances
and topics as simpler than they really are.” 147 In the child witness
field, limiting interpretation of evidence to one of two camps of
thought about children’s testimonial reliability is an example of
reductive thinking that does little to improve our understanding of
145. Id. at 590–91.
146. Rand J. Spiro, Paul J. Feltovich & Richard L. Coulson, Two
Epistemic World-Views: Prefigurative Schemas and Learning in Complex
Domains, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. S51 (1996).
147. See id. at S52; Paul J. Feltovich, Rand J. Spiro & Richard L.
Coulson, Issues of Expert Flexibility in Contexts Characterized by Complexity
and Change, in EXPERTISE IN CONTEXT: HUMAN AND MACHINE 125, 128 (Paul
J. Feltovich, Kenneth M. Ford, & Robert R. Hoffman, eds., 1997).
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children’s testimonial abilities.
Individuals with a reductive worldview hold beliefs about
knowledge and learning (i.e., epistemic beliefs) that lead them to
view situations as having just one or a few possibilities. They also
view situations as being fixed in time and comprised of features,
acting separately, that are understood in terms of universally
applicable principles. 148 Applied to child witness cases, the
reductive view asks whether testimony is true or false, rather
than asking which aspects of testimony are true and false; focuses
on static time-points in a case, rather than analyzing how
testimony developed over time; analyzes important case features
individually, rather than recognizing interactions among case
features; and applies information about factors that influence
testimony similarly across cases, rather than appreciating the
context specificity of that information. Counterintuitively, time on
the job does not always remedy the tendency to simplify because
some jobs provide inadequate feedback about the accuracy of one’s
decisions 149 and, in some circumstances, decision-making through
the lens of the reductive bias solidifies this pattern of thought. 150
The four principles of children’s testimony in this review can
counteract reductive thinking by reminding us that testimonial
accuracy is dependent on context at all ages, that neurological
immaturity creates vulnerabilities that impact testimony
differently for children of different ages and developmental
trajectories, and that many developmental phenomena influence
testimonial quality. These complexities dictate the need for
evidence-based protocols for interviewing children, 151 thorough
investigative approaches, and case analyses based on time-lines
that track children’s reports across time and contexts. 152
148. Feltovich et al., supra note 147, at 134.
149. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (Farrar,
Straus and Giroux 2013).
150. See Feltovich et al., supra note 147, at 136.
151. See generally MICHAEL E. LAMB, IRIT HERSHKOWITZ, YAEL ORBACH,
PHILIP W. ESPLIN, TELL ME WHAT HAPPENED: STRUCTURED INVESTIGATIVE
INTERVIEWS OF CHILD VICTIMS AND WITNESSES (2008).; see also, e.g., STATE OF
MICHIGAN GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT & DEP’T OF
HUMAN SERVICES, FORENSIC INTERVIEWING PROTOCOL 1–21 (3d ed. 2011).
152. See generally Maggie Bruck & Steven J. Ceci, Forensic
Developmental Psychology in the Courtroom, in COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 723–36 (David Faust ed., Press 6th ed. 2012).

